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THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE
INJURY ACT OF 1986: A SOLUTION TO THE
VACCINE LIABILITY CRISIS?
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act,I enacted by Congress
in November 1986, responds to a vaccine liability crisis that has
threatened the nation's supply of childhood vaccines. While
mandatory immunization has nearly eradicated life-threatening childhood diseases in the United States,2 the vaccines themselves are not
perfectly safe. Adverse reactions to vaccines which have been administered properly and manufactured properly resulted in injury and
death to vaccinees. 3 Injured vaccinees have brought numerous and
costly tort actions against vaccine manufacturers, prompting many
manufacturers to discontinue production of childhood vaccines. 4 This
halt in production has led to a dwindling vaccine supply and has
placed the nation's immunization programs in severe jeopardy.5
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act ("the Act") addresses
this crisis by establishing the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program, a no-fault, nontort compensation alternative for individuals
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-10 to -33 (West Supp. 1987).
2. Children routinely receive vaccinations against seven diseases: Diptheria, tetanus, pertussis
(whooping cough), measles, mumps, rubella (German measles), and polio. Vaccination has
reduced incidences of these diseases as follows: Diptheria, from 200,000 cases in 1921 to an
average of three cases per year from 1980 through 1984; tetanus, from 601 cases in 1948 to fewer
than 95 cases in 1983; pertussis, from 265,269 cases and 7,518 deaths in 1934 to 2,276 cases and
12 deaths in 1984; measles, from 525,000 cases annually reported before 1962 to 2,534 cases in
1984; mumps, from 150,000 cases in 1968 to fewer than 3,500 cases in 1982; rubella, from 12.5
million cases during the 1964 and 1965 rubella epidemic to an average of 11 cases per year from
1980 through 1982; polio, from 57,000 cases in 1952 to an average of 12 cases per year from 1974
to 1983. SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND THE ENV. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SeSS., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS 5-15 (Comm. Print 1986)

[hereinafter CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS].
3. Polio contracted from oral polio vaccine is estimated to occur once in 3.2 million doses,
leading to an estimated five cases each year. Encephalitis (swelling of the brain) following the
administration of the diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis ("DTP") vaccine is estimated to occur 3.2
times per million doses, leading to an estimated 43.2 cases each year. Encephalitis following
measles vaccination is estimated to result in about 10 cases each year. Deaths due to
anaphylactic shock from all vaccines is estimated to be one in 10 million doses for a total of five
to six cases each year. Vaccine Injury Compensation, 1984: Hearings on H.R. 556 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1984) (statement of Dr.
Alan R. Nelson, Member, Board of Trustees, American Medical Ass'n) [hereinafter Vaccine
Compensation Hearings].
4. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2, at 85-86.
5. Vaccine CompensationHearings,supra note 3, at 119 (statement of Drs. Martin H. Smith,
President-Elect, American Academy of Pediatrics, and Alan R. Nelson, Board of Trustees,
American Medical Ass'n).
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injured by compulsory childhood immunization. The Act fairly compensates injured vaccinees and decreases the threat of severe vaccine
shortages. There are, however, shortcomings in Congress' compensation scheme.
This Comment addresses the role of the tort system in the vaccine
liability crisis and analyzes the probable success of the Act in resolving
the crisis. This Comment recommends that the Act be amended to
prohibit all actions against vaccine manufacturers based on failure to
warn theories. Even though failure to warn is not a proper basis for
finding civil liability, this Comment suggests that the Food and Drug
Administration establish guidelines, enforceable under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 to require that each vaccinee receives
an adequate warning of the risks associated with vaccination.
I.

THE SOURCES AND NATURE OF THE VACCINE
LIABILITY CRISIS

A.

The Health Benefits and Risks of Mandatory Immunization

All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws
requiring proof of immunization before a child enters school.' In most
states, immunization is required against seven diseases: Polio, measles,
mumps, rubella, diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis.' Mandatory vaccination has brought about a sharp decrease in the incidences of these
diseases. 9
Although immunization programs safeguard the health of millions
of children, a tiny fraction of vaccinees, or in the case of polio, those
who come in close contact with vaccinees, I° will either experience
severe reactions to vaccines or contract the very disease the vaccine is
designed to prevent." These injuries occur through no fault of the
vaccine manufacturer; rather, they are an unavoidable cost of mass
6. 21 U.S.C. §§ 1-1194 (1982).
7. CHII.DHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2, at 103-06; see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.31.100 (1985) (requiring immunization of children prior to attendance at school or day
care, except where the child has a medical condition making it inadvisable or the parents have a
philosophical or religious belief against immunization).
8. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2. at 1.
9. See supra note 2.
10. Because the live virus polio vaccine operates in the intestinal tract, some virus is expelled
in the feces. Unvaccinated persons coming in close contact with the feces of recently vaccinated
persons-generally from handling diapers-can develop polio. Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories,
121 Mich. App. 73. 328 N.W.2d 576, 579 (1982).
1I. See supra note 3.
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innoculation. 12 Because the children who benefit from vaccines far
outnumber those who are harmed by them, the consensus of health
and medical experts is that children should continue to be
immunized. 3
B.

The Effect of Vaccine Litigation on Vaccine Supply

In recent years, vaccine manufacturers have been beset by an
increasing number of lawsuits initiated by injured vaccinees.14 Lawsuits against manufacturers rose from 24 in 1980 to approximately 150
in 1985.15 These suits have subjected a small number of manufacturers 6 to high litigation costs 17 and enormous potential liabilities.' 8
12. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2, at 21-32.
The underlying cause of adverse reactions to vaccines is not entirely understood. Medical
experts have, however, identified a number of factors that may contribute to unpredictable
adverse reactions to vaccines. Reactions may occur due to undefinable characteristics in persons
vaccinated, biologic properties of the vaccine, or a temporal association between vaccination and
the adverse reaction. For example, live viral vaccines are contraindicated in children with
certain immunodeficiency syndromes. These hereditary syndromes are rarely recognized,
however, before two months of age, the time at which routine immunization usually begins. The
child, therefore, cannot be distinguished immunologically from normal persons until after the
reaction to a vaccine occurs. Vaccines may also trigger or precipitate manifestations of an
underlying disease. In other instances, the timing of the vaccine administration simply coincides
with the appearance of an unrelated disease. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND
INNOVATION 66-69 (1985).
13. Vaccine Compensation Hearings, supra 'note 3, at I (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman).
14. Id. at 234 (statement of Robert B. Johnson, President, Lederle Laboratories). Lederle is
one of two companies manufacturing polio and DTP vaccines.
15.
Number of Vaccine Injury Lawsuits Filed By Year, 1980-85
YEAR
NUMBER OF SUITS
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985(est.)

24
29
39
70
101
144

63-month total
299
supra note 2, at 86.
16. Presently, Merck Sharp & Dohne is the only manufacturer of mumps, measles, and
rubella ("MMR") vaccine. Only two firms, Lederle and Connaught, produce polio vaccines.
Only Lederle produces oral polio vaccine ("OPV"), and only Connaught produces inactivated
polio vaccine ("IPV"). In addition, Connaught and Lederle presently are the only commercial
manufacturers of DTP vaccine. Massachusetts and Michigan state health departments produce
the vaccine as well. Id. at 67-70.
17. Manufacturers' litigation defense costs not reimbursed by insurance totalled $4.7 million
in 1983 and $9.8 million in 1984. Id. at 87.
18. Plaintiffs alleging vaccine-related injuries have requested in excess of $3.5 billion in
damages from vaccine manufacturers. Id. at 86.
CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS,
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Many of the nation's pharmaceutical companies have withdrawn
from the vaccine market due to the economic unpredictability caused
by vaccine injury suits.' 9 Between 1966 and 1977, half of the nation's
vaccine manufacturers stopped producing and distributing childhood
vaccines. 2° By 1985, only four commercial firms produced and distributed the primary vaccines used in compulsory vaccination programs. 2
Wyeth Laboratories, for example, announced in 1984 that it had
ceased production of the diptheria, tetanus, and pertussis ("DTP")
vaccine "because of extreme liability exposure, cost of litigation and
the difficulty of continuing to obtain adequate insurance."2 2 Connaught Laboratories experienced similiar difficulties. In 1984, it withdrew temporarily from the vaccine market because of its inability to
renegotiate its product liability insurance coverage.2 3 Lederle Laboratories also publicly questioned whether it would continue to manufacture vaccines in the face of costly litigation.24
This reduction in the number of producers of childhood vaccines
places the nation's immunization programs at risk. Any interruption
in vaccine production in a system lacking excess capacity or duplication of producers could create severe vaccine shortages.2 5
C.

The Theory of Recovery Under the Common Law: The
Manufacturers' Duty To Warn Vaccinees

1.

The Duty To Warn Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A comment k

Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets out the basic
rule for assessing the liability of manufacturers for product related
injuries.* 21 It provides that even if a seller exercises all possible care in
the preparation or sale of a product, it will be held strictly liable for
physical injury or property damage which results from the product.2 7
According to the Restatement, however, vaccines are excepted from
this rule of strict product liability.2 8 Comment k to section 402A rec19. Id. at 72-84.
20. Id. at 72.
21. Id.
22. Vaccine Compensation Hearings,supra note 3,at 295 (statement of Dr. Daniel L. Shaw.
Jr., Vice-President, Medical Affairs, Wyeth Laboratories).
23. Id. at 266 (statement of Dr. James Mason, Director. Center for Disease Control).
24. Id. at 239 (statement of Robert D. Johnson, President, Lederle Laboratories).
25. Id. at 317 (statement of Dr. Alan R. Nelson, Board of Trustees, American Medical
Ass'n).
26. RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) On TORTs § 402 A (1965).
27. Id.
28. Id. comment k.

National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
ognizes that vaccines are "unavoidably unsafe products" because, even
with current scientific knowledge and skill, vaccines cannot be made
perfectly safe for their intended and ordinary use.2 9 Comment k suggests that a manufacturer of an "unavoidably unsafe product" should
not be held to a strict product liability standard. This is because the
manufacturer has undertaken to supply the public with a useful and
desirable product, attendant with known but apparently reasonable
risks." So long as an "unavoidably unsafe product" is properly prepared and accompanied with an adequate warning, according to comment k, it is neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous. 31 Under
this standard, an individual injured by a vaccine that is properly prepared and accompanied with an adequate warning should not prevail
against a vaccine manufacturer.3 2
2.

JudicialInterpretation of Vaccine Manufacturers'Duty To Warn

Vaccine manufacturers have been uncertain whether they will be
held liable for failure to provide an adequate vaccine warning because
33
what constitutes an adequate warning varies among jurisdictions.
Some courts barred recovery against manufacturers when the vaccine
was administered by a private physician who received an adequate
warning from the vaccine manufacturer.3 4 Other courts, however,
have ignored the adequacy of the warning to the physician when the
vaccine was administered in a mass innoculation setting. 35 For these
courts, manufacturers are held liable to injured vaccinees if the manufacturer failed to provide a direct warning to the vaccine recipient, or
the recipient's parent, prior to innoculation. 36 Moreover, one court
37
extended the duty to warn directly to the private physician setting.
a.

Vaccine Manufacturers'Duty To Warn Under the Learned
IntermediaryDoctrine

Under the learned intermediary doctrine a manufacturer of a
presciption drug has a legal duty to warn the prescribing physician,
and not the drug recipient, of any foreseeable risks inherent in the use
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

infra text
itfra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying notes 43-46, 51-65, 81-89.
accompanying notes 43-46.
accompanying notes 51-59.
accompanying notes 49-59.
acccompanying notes 60-65.
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of the drug.38 Underlying the doctrine is the assumption that the
prescibing physician is in a better position than the drug manufacturer
to evaluate and to balance the dangers of a prescription drug against
its utility. 39 The prescribing physician acts as the "learned intermedi-

ary" between the manufacturer and the consumer.4 ° A warning to the
physician alone is therefore adequate. Although the manufacturer has
no duty to warn the recipient directly, the recipient may assert a claim
directly against the manufacturer if the manufacturer's duty to warn
the prescribing physician is not met. 4
Generally vaccine manufacturers escape liability when courts apply
the learned intermediary doctrine. 42 A number of courts have held
that if a vaccine manufacturer provides the physician with a full and
adequate warning, the manufacturer will not be liable when a vaccinee
is subsequently injured. In Johnson v. American Cyanamid,4 3 for
example, the Kansas Supreme Court applied the learned intermediary
standard and dismissed a vaccine injury suit against American Cyanamid. According to the Johnson court, holding a manufacturer liable is
only warranted if an inadequate warning was provided with the product.4 Because the vaccine manufacturer had provided an adequate
warning to the vaccinee's private physician, there was no basis for a
claim of negligence against American Cyanamid.4 5 Other courts have
followed this rule.4 6
Even when manufacturers have breached their duty to warn adequately prescibing physicians, some courts have declined to impose
liability because there was no finding of proximate cause between the
breach of the manufacturers' duty and the subsequent vaccine injuries. 47 These courts reasoned that even if a vaccine manufacturer had
38. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drugs, 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970); see also 2 M. DIXON,
DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.01[2] (1986).
39. 2 M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.02[l] (1986).

40. Id. § 9.02[2].
41. Id. § 9.02[1].
42. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
43. 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986).
44. Johnson, 718 P.2d at 1325.
45. Id. at 1326.
46. See, e.g.. Schendler v. Lederle Laboratories, 725 F.2d 1036. 1037 (6th Cir. 1983) (judgment
in favor of vaccine manufacturer because the package insert provided an adequate warning):
Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341 F.2d 14, 17 (6th Cir. 1965) (there is no privity of contract
between vaccine manufacturer and vaccinee when the vaccine is distributed to a physician);
Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 467 (1985) (vaccine
manufacturer not liable to injured vaccinee because its warning to the physician was "plain and
explicit").
47. Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576. 584 (1983) (even if
the manufacturer had provided an adequate warning, plaintiff would have chosen to be
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still have
provided an adequate warning, the vaccine recipient would
48
chosen to take the small risk of injury and be vaccinated.
b.

Vaccine Manufacturers'Duty To Warn Under the Direct
Warning Rule

When courts have required manufacturers to warn the patient
rather than the learned intermediary, vaccine manufacturers have
been found liable to injured vaccinees. 49 The direct warning rule provides that a manufacturer's full disclosure to the physician of the
material risks of the vaccine is inadequate.5 0 Instead, manufacturers
have a duty to warn the vaccine recipient directly.
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,Inc.,5 1 the Ninth Circuit found liability by holding the vaccine manufacturer to this more stringent duty.
The court recognized that ordinarily an adequate warning to the prescribing physician is sufficient to relieve a pharmaceutical company
from liability. In this case, however, the vaccine was distributed at a
mass immunization clinic without the individualized balancing by a
physician of the risks of the vaccine.5 3 The Davis court noted that the
vaccine manufacturer knew that the warnings were not reaching the
vaccine recipient. 4 In light of these observations, the court held that
where a vaccine is administered at a mass immunization clinic, manufacturers are responsible for ensuring that warnings directly reach
each consumer. 55 Because the defendant, Wyeth Laboratories, failed
to provide a direct warning, strict liability attached to its sale of the
vaccine. 6
vaccinated because the risk of vaccine related polio is lower than the risk of infection from a
nonvaccinated person); Samuels v. American Cyanamid, 130 Misc. 2d 175, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006,
1007 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (injured vaccinee has burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that absence of warning was injury's proximate cause); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer &
Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1975) (plaintiff must prove that a reasonably prudent person
would have refused to take the vaccine if an adequate warning had been given).
48. Dunn, 328 N.W.2d at 584; Samuels, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 1007; Cunningham, 532 P.2d at
1382.
49. See infra text accompaning notes 52-65; see also Stahleber v: American Cyanamid, 451
S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970).
50. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968).
51. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
52. Id. at 130.
53. Id. at 131.
54. Id. The court reasoned that Wyeth Laboratories knew that the warnings were not
reaching the vaccinees because it took an active part in setting up the mass immunization clinic
program. Wyeth Laboratories was aware, according to the court, that the program did not make
any provision to warn vaccinees, either in advertising or at the clinics themselves. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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57
In Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
the Fifth Circuit also applied the
direct warning standard and held Wyeth Laboratories strictly liable to
an injured vaccinee who received the vaccine at a county health clinic.
The court rejected Wyeth's argument that liablity was barred because
it provided an adequate warning in a package insert to the public
health nurse who administered the vaccine. 58 The Fifth Circuit held
that the vaccine manufacturer was under a duty to warn the vaccine
recipient directly because the manufacturer could forsee that the vaccine would be administered without a physician balancing the risks of
the particular vaccine. 59
6
In Givens v. Lederle Laboratories,
" the Fifth Circuit extended the
direct warning rule to a setting in which the vaccine was administered
by a private physician. Although this is the classic learned intermediary context,6 1 the court declined to impose that doctrine and held
Lederle Laboratories liable to the injured vaccinee. 61 Even though
Lederle disclosed the risks of the vaccine to the prescribing physician,6 3 the physician failed to provide a warning to either the vaccine
recipient or the recipient's parents. 64 The court reasoned that "[t]he
administration of the vaccine by a public health nurse in Reyes is as
' 65
close to the instant situation as it is to the Davis mass innoculation.

II.

THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT
OF 1986

Congress enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act in
November 1986. The Act established a National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program designed to protect the vaccine supply from the
market instability created by the increasing number of vaccine injury
lawsuits. 66 The Act is a mandatory no-fault, nontort compensation
scheme for individuals injured by routinely administered childhood
vaccines. It requires injured vaccinees to fully adjudicate their claims
through the federal compensation program before filing a civil action
57. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
58. Id. at 1276.

59. Id. at 1277. Expert testimony established that a great majority of vaccinees receive the
polio vaccine by mass administration by volunteers. Id.
60. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
61. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
62. Givens, 556 F.2d at 1346.
63. Id. at 1343.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1344.
66. H.R. Ri-FP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1986) [hereinafter VACCINi
REPORT], reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMIN. Ni-ws 6344.

HOUSF
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in the courts.6 7 The Act further limits the type of actions that may be
brought against vaccine manufacturers should a claimant ultimately
reject statutory compensation and choose to pursue a tort action. It
also imposes an ethical obligation upon attorneys to advise individual
clients that compensation may be available under the program when
consulted about a vaccine-related injury or death.68
A.

Statutory Compensation to Injured Vaccinees Under the Act

The Act sets out specific procedures by which compensation for a
vaccine-related injury or death may be obtained. 69 A claimant first
files a petition with the United States district court in either the jurisdiction where the petitioner resides or where the injury occurred. 0 A
petition for compensation contains an affidavit and supporting documentation demonstrating that the injured person received one of the
vaccines set forth in the Act's Vaccine Injury Table.7 1
Compensation is awarded if the court finds that the petitioner has
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the injured or
deceased person received a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury
Table72 or contracted polio from a person who received an oral polio
vaccine.7 3 After the judgment of the district court, the petitioner must
accept or reject the judgment by filing an election with the court. If
the petitioner elects to receive compensation under the Act, he or she
is prohibited from bringing a subsequent civil action against a vaccine
manufacturer. 74
B.

Civil Remedies for Injured Vaccinees Under the Act

If the petitioner elects to reject the statutory award and file a civil
action against a vaccine manufacturer,7" the action is limited in two
significant respects. First, the manufacturer is not liable if the injury
resulted from the "unavoidable" side effects of a vaccine that was
properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and warn67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-ll(2)(A) (West Supp. 1987).
68. Id. § 300aa-1O(B).
69. Id. § 300aa-1l.
70. Id. § 300aa-I l(a)(1).
71. Id. § 300aa-14. The "Vaccine Injury Table" is a table of vaccines, the injuries and deaths
that are known to result from the administration of such vaccines, and the time period in which
the first symptoms of adverse reactions to such vaccines will result. The table includes the DTP
vaccine, the MMR vaccine and the inactivated and activated polio vaccines. Id.
72. Id. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(A).
73. Id. §§ 300aa-1l(c)(l)(A), -13(a)(1)(A).
74. Id. § 300aa-21(a).
75. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 63:149, 1988

ings.7 6 To meet this standard, a vaccine manufacturer must demonstrate that it complied with all requirements of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act,"7 and with section 351 of the Public Health
Service Act.78 Second, a manufacturer will not be liable in a civil
action if the vaccine injury resulted solely from the manufacturer's
failure to provide direct warnings to the injured party.7 9
III.

ANALYSIS

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act is a superior vaccine
injury compensation program to the tort recovery system for three
principal reasons. First, the Act provides a necessary alternative to
the tort recovery system which proved unworkable because of courts'
inconsistent and unpredictable application of the duty to warn standard to vaccine manufacturers. Second, the Act provides a fair compensation scheme to injured vaccinees because it requires society as a
whole to bear the cost of inevitable vaccine injuries. Third, the Act
creates a more stable litigation climate for vaccine manufacturers and
thus decreases significantly the threat of severe vaccine shortages.
The Act, however, falls short in two ways. First, the Act could be
amended to prohibit all tort actions against manufacturers on failure
to warn theories. Although it prohibits injured vaccinees from suing
manufacturers on a failure to warn directly theory, the Act permits
claimants to continue to file civil actions against manufacturers for
failure to provide adequate warnings to the learned intermediary.80
The retention of this cause of action could give rise to the same economic instability that the threat of litigation produced under the old
tort recovery system. The Act, therefore, fails to entirely eliminate the
threat of vaccine shortages.
Second, the Act could be amended to provide guidelines to ensure
that complete and adequate warnings reach each vaccinee. Although
civil liability should not attach to vaccine manufacturers on failure to
warn theories, vaccine recipients must receive warnings so they can
monitor for potential adverse reactions from a vaccine.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1).
21 U.S.C. §§ 1-1194 (1982).
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
Id. § 300aa-22(b).
Id.
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A.

The Tort Recovery System Proved Unworkable When
Adjudicating Vaccine Injury Claims

Congress correctly recognized that to solve the vaccine liability crisis, vaccine injury claims had to be removed from the tort system.
Courts and juries, when balancing the compensation for innocent victims against the seemingly bottomless deep pocket of pharmaceutical
companies, were inconsistent in their assessment of the manufacturers'
duty to warn injured vaccinees. This uncertainty created a disincentive for manufacturers to continue producing childhood vaccines.
Moreover, the tort theory of failure to warn, asserted by injured vaccinees in their attempts to recover against vaccine manufacturers, was
misapplied in the context of compulsory immunization.
L

The JudiciaryFailed To Establish a Consistent Duty
To Warn Standard

Under the tort recovery system, vaccine manufacturers were unable
to determine an acceptable vaccine warning standard because courts
were neither uniform nor predictable in their assessment of the duty to
warn. 1 If the manufacturers' duty to warn was based solely on the
clear-cut distinction between the two settings in which a vaccine is
administered-by a private physician or at a mass immunization
clinic-manufacturers would have been better able to assess their
duties, and thus potential liabilities. Courts failed to observe this distinction, however, leaving vaccine manufacturers unable to predict
which warning standard a court would apply.
This uncertainty is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's holding in Givens v. Lederle Laboratories8 2 in which the court departed from its clear
precedent. Without any supporting analysis,83 and contradicting its
rationale in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,84 the court in Givens imposed
a direct warning standard on a manufacturer whose vaccine had been
administered by a private physician in the physician's office. 85 Prior to
Givens, the Fifth Circuit in Reyes stated in dicta that it "cannot quarrel with the general proposition" that where a vaccine is administered
81. See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
82. 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977).
83. To reach its conclusion that the direct warning rule applies to the private physician
setting, the court in Givens merely relied on the testimony of the private pediatrician who
immunized the injured vaccinee. Givens, 556 E2d at 1345. The physician blankly stated that
"the administration in his office 'really doesn't differ' from that of the Public Health Center; 'not
in administration at all.'" Id.
84. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 1345.
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as a prescription drug, the pharmaceutical company is required to
warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as the learned intermediary between manufacturer and consumer.86 The court in Reyes suggested that it would apply the direct warning rule only in the mass
immunization setting where there is no learned intermediary.8 7
The Givens case had far-reaching implications for vaccine manufacturers.8 8 Commentators evaluating the impact of the decision stated
that Givens stood for the proposition that "manufacturers are going to
pay, one way or the other."89
Even when vaccine manufacturers ultimately prevailed in a lawsuit,
the cost and uncertainty of defending claims created a disincentive for
manufacturers to continue the production of vaccines.9" In the Johnson case, for example, the trial court issued a ten million dollar judgment against Lederle Laboratories for an injury allegedly caused by its
polio vaccine. 9' After two years and an appeal to the Kansas Supreme
Court, Lederle Laboratories finally had the judgment reversed. 92
Vaccinees Need Not Rely on Strained Tort Analysis for Recovery

2.

The failure to warn doctrine, the prevailing tort theory used by
claimants against vaccine manufacturers,9 3 is an inappropriate basis
for determining manufacturers' liability to injured vaccinees. In order
for a claimant successfully to recover on a failure to warn theory, the
claimant must prove that the lack of an adequate vaccine warning
proximately caused the injury. 94 To prove proximate cause, the claim86. Id. at 1276.
87. Id.
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 93 (1985).
89. Id.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24; see also Vaccine Compensation Hearings,supra
note 3, at 234-35 (statement of Robert D. Johnson, President, Lederle Laboratories) (-The
present dollar demand of DTP lawsuits against Lederle is 200 times greater than our total sales
of DTP vaccine in 1983. For polio vaccine, the dollar demand of lawsuits is more than twelve
times greater than our total sales of [polio vaccine].").
91. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
92. Johnson v. American Cyanamid, 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318, 1320 (1986).
93. Id., 718 P.2d at 1326.
94. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 367, 372 (1986). Proximate cause is generally considered an element of the negligence
standard. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984). Under
traditional tort analysis, therefore, liability for failing to provide an adequate warning should be
measured against a negligence standard. According to this standard, there must be a reasonable
or proximate connection between the omission of the defendant and the injury which the plaintiff
has suffered. Id. There should be no connection between the omission of a warning and a
vaccine injury because, with or or without a warning, a school-aged child is required by law to be
vaccinated. Without the option to refuse vaccination, therefore, proximate cause analysis under
the negligence standard is severely curtailed.
88.
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the warning,
ant must,demonstrate that had the manufacturer given
95
the claimant would have chosen not to be vaccinated.
There is a limit to utilizing proximate cause analysis in vaccine
injury litigation, however, because children are not free to refuse vaccination. Whether or not the administrator of the vaccine communicates the manufacturer's warning, compulsory vaccination programs
require that parents immunize their children before they may attend
school. 96 The 96% compliance rate97 of these programs suggests that
refusal is not an option.
Even if a parent may refuse to vaccinate a child, a second obstacle
to proving proximate cause on a failure to warn theory exists. A proximate cause determination does not depend on the choice a particular
claimant would have made had the physician provided a full disclosure of the manufacturer's warning.9" Rather, the claimant must
prove that the hypothetical reasonable person would not have agreed
to be vaccinated.9 9 State legislatures have already performed a costbenefit assessment and determined that despite the known risks of vac00
cines it is better to be immunized and risk a small chance of injury.1
Even with full disclosure of the risks under tort theory, therefore, a
reasonable person would not refuse vaccination. Consequently, a
plaintiff should not be able to be able to prove proximate cause.
and the Oklahoma Supreme
Both a New York trial court'
Court'
denied recovery based on this proximate cause analysis.
These courts held that a manufacturer had a duty to warn the recipient of a vaccine but that the recipient had to prove that "a reasonably
prudent person in plaintiff's position [would] have refused the vaccine
if adequate warnings of the risks had been given. ' In each case the
courts exonerated the vaccine manufacturers on the ground that the
claimants
would have taken the vaccine even if a warning had been
given.1°4
95. See Tietz, supra note 94, at 372.
96. See supra note 7.
97. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2, at 47.
98. Tietz, supra note 94, at 368.
99. Id.
100. Vaccine Compensation Hearings, supra note 3, at I (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman).
101. Samuels v. American Cyanamid, 130 Misc. 2d 175, 495 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985).
102. Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974).
103. Id. at 1382.
104. Samuels, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 1015; Cunningham, 532 P.2d at 1382-83.
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The desire of courts and juries to compensate innocent victims of
vaccinations is commendable. Some courts, however, stretched the
tort doctrine of failure to warn beyond its reasonable limits. The
result was the unpredictable application of warning standards by the
courts to vaccine manufacturers. Realizing the instability the tort
sytem introduced into the vaccine marketplace, Congress turned to a
federal statutory scheme.
Congress, through the Act, addressed directly the judicial decisions
that created uncertainty for vaccine manufacturers. 0 5 The Act
explicitly provides a clear and certain warning standard by eliminating
the manufacturers' duty to warn directly. 10 6 Once a manufacturer
provides an adequate warning to the learned intermediary, the manufacturers' potential liability to injured vaccinees is severed. The Act,
therefore, removes the primary uncertainty created by the courts'
unpredictable and inconsistent application of warning standards. This
certainty will prompt manufacturers to continue producing childhood
vaccines. 107
The Act further decreases the possibility of vaccine shortages
because the no-fault compensation option will divert litigants away
from the tort system. Such diversion will limit the exposure of manufacturers to liability based on tenuous and unpredictable theories of
recovery, thereby creating an incentive for manufacturers to remain in
the vaccine market. Because injured vaccinees are required first fully
to adjudicate their claims under Congress' compensation program,
they are less likely to file suit against vaccine manufacturers. If the
injured vaccinee elects to file a civil action, the vaccinee must reject the
injury award and undertake the difficult task of proving fault on the
part of the vaccine manufacturer. A sure compensation award under
the Act is, therefore, likely to be a more appealing alternative than
pursuing a lawsuit against a vaccine manufacturer.
B.

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act More Fairly
Compensates Injured Vaccinees

In three respects, the Act resolves adequately the unfairness created
by the tort recovery system. First, society, instead of the innocent victim or innocent manufacturer, bears the burden of compensating individuals injured by compulsory vaccination.' °8 Second, a uniform
105. VACCINE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 27.

106. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(c) (West Supp. 1987).
107. VACCINE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 7, 12.
108. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund is established by an excise tax
imposed on the sale of childhood vaccines. The taxes are expected to generate $40 million in the
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federal standard for compensating vaccine victims guarantees similarly situated individuals equal compensation. Third, the Act ensures
prompt compensation presently unavailable to injured vaccinees
through the tort recovery system.
1. Society Bears the Burden of Compensating Injured Vaccinees
Society should bear the cost of vaccine injuries because with compulsory immunization programs it knowingly undertakes the risk that
a small number of children will inevitably suffer severe reactions from
vaccination. States, not manufacturers, mandate immunization
because the entire community benefits from the "herd immunity" provided by compulsory imminization.' 09 When a large proportion of the
community is immune to a disease, there is a reduced likelihood that
the disease can be introduced into the group and spread to the few
susceptible individuals. Herd immunity accounts for the absence of
epidemics in communities with a high proportion of immune individuals because the chance of contact between inflicted and susceptible persons is greatly reduced. 110
Manufacturers have been penalized inappropriately by bearing the
cost of no-fault vaccine injuries. The primary result has been manufacturers' unwillingess to continue to produce childhood vaccines."'
The Act, therefore, places responsibility for compensation where it
belongs. The cost is borne by society as a whole rather than by vaccine manufacturers alone.
2.

The Act Compensates Similarly Situated Injured
Vaccinees Equally

Prior to the adoption of the Act, liabilty for injury resulting from
vaccination was a matter of state law. 1 2 Thus, there were potentially
fifty-one different sets of rules for vaccine injury suits in the United
States." 3 The result was a tort system which was not evenhanded
when adjudicating vaccine injury claims." 4 Judges and juries found
vaccine manufacturers liable when the manufactuer was not neglifirst year. The taxes are set at different rates to reflect the relative reactogenecity of vaccines.
VACCINE HOUSE REPORT, supranote 66, at 34. Because the Act is funded through an excise tax
on vaccines, all users of vaccines pay for the cost of inevitable vaccine injuries. Id.
109. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
112.

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 85 (1985).

113. Id.
114. Id.
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gent. "1 5 A vaccinee's ability to recover, therefore, depended in large
part on whether sympathetic judges and juries in a particular jurisdiction were willing to stretch tort doctrine in order to provide compensation. Given similar facts, a court in one jurisdiction would deny
recovery' 16 while a court in another jurisdiction would award a child
multimillion dollar damages.'
The Act guarantees sufficient recovery to all individuals injured by
compulsory immunization. Potential compensation is divided into
four types: First, medical and rehabilitative care; second, death benefits of $250,000; third, lost earnings, not to be reduced by other government benefits for which the injured vaccinee might be eligible; and
fourth, pain and suffering benefits, not to exceed $250,000.' t' This
compensation scheme seeks to make injured vaccinees whole.
Although it forecloses the possibility of injured vaccinees receiving
multimillion dollar awards, the Act eliminates the tremendous discrepencies of injury awards under the tort recovery system." 9
3.

The Act Promptly Compensates Injured Vaccinees

The Act also guarantees prompt compensation. An injured vaccinee who attempts to resolve a claim through the tort system waits an
average of six to eight years before the claim is settled or tried in
court. 120 The Act creates a swift, uncomplicated system which will
resolve claims quickly. The Vaccine Injury Table under the Act sets
forth a list of vaccines, injuries, and time periods of initial onset of the
injuries.' 2 ' The complainant must demonstrate to a district court that
122
the injury occurred within the time period specified in the table.
Because the only issues relevant to the compensation proceeding are
whether the petitioner suffered a compensable injury and, if so, the
extent of compensable damages, there is no need for inquiry into the
issues that would be raised in a civil action.' 2 3 Consequently, the
115. See supra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
116. Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1983) (no
proximate cause was shown between the manufacturer's failure to warn the plaintiff and the
plaintiff contracting poliomyelitis from her daughter shortly after she was vaccinated).
117. Plummer v. Lederle Laboratories, No. 81-2037 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1984) ($3.2 million
verdict against manufacturer for failing to warn plaintiff who contracted poliomyelitis from his
granddaughter shortly after she had been vaccinated).
118. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15 (West Supp. 1987).
119. VACCINE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 20-21.
120. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 2, at 37.

121. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-14 (West Supp. 1987).
122. Id. § 300aa- I 1(c).
123.

VACCINE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 66, at 16.
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entire proceeding can be expeditiously completed. In no case should a
petitioner have to wait more than a year to receive compensation.1 24
C. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Should Be the
Exclusive Forum for Recovery for Injured Vaccinees
1. All Civil Actions Based on Failure To Warn Theories
Should Be Prohibited
The Act has not eliminated entirely the possibility of vaccine
shortages because it retains some threat of suits against vaccine manufacturers. They continue to be exposed to uncertainty because claimants may still elect to sue manufacturers for failing to provide an
adequate warning to a learned intermediary.12 5 The threat of litigacompanies to
tion has been the primary incentive for pharmaceutical
12 6
discontinue their manufacture of childhood vaccines.
An amendment to the Act to prohibit all actions against vaccine
manufacturers on failure to warn theories would more adequately protect the supply of childhood vaccines. Retaining this cause of action
only continues to create uncertainty for manufacturers and provides
no benefit to injured vaccinees. Claimants who do not receive an
award under the compensation program, or who receive what they
consider to be an inadequate award, will have an incentive to elect to
file a civil action against manufacturers on a failure to warn theory.
The continued threat of litigation, even where recovery is unlikely,
may induce manufacturers to continue to withdraw from vaccine

production. 127
In addition, this cause of action should not be retained for the sake
of injured vaccinees. If an individual is injured by a compulsory childhood vaccine, the Act guarantees fair compensation.12 8 Moreover, an
injured vaccinee is unlikely to recover if a suit against a vaccine manufacturer is elected because the failure to warn theory under tort law is
not tenable in the context of compulsory immunization. Rather, a
requirement for a direct warning to vaccinees is better dealt with by a
statutory requirement under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.

129

124. Id. at 17.
125. Id. at 26-27.
126. Vaccine CompensationHearings,supra note 3, at 234 (statement of Robert B. Johnson,
President, Lederle Laboratories).
127. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
129. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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The Act Should Provide Guidelines To Ensure That Adequate
Warnings Reach Vaccine Recipients

Although lawsuits against manufacturers on failure to warn theories
should be prohibited, the Act properly requires vaccine manufacturers
to provide full and adequate warnings to prescribing physicians. In
addition, however, the Act could be amended to establish direct warning requirements for the large clinic setting where warnings are most
needed.
The Act, by prohibiting civil actions against vaccine manufacturers
for failure to warn directly vaccine recipients, in effect eliminates manufacturers' duty to warn directly. The Ninth Circuit in Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories and the Fifth Circuit in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratoriescorrectly perceived that in the mass immunization setting vaccines are
dispensed in an "assembly line" fashion with neither the time nor the
personnel to provide individualized warnings.130 A duty to provide
direct warnings should, therefore, be imposed on both manufacturers
and administrators of vaccines. This duty, enforceable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, would guarantee adequate and
understandable disclosures to individuals vaccinated at mass immunization centers.
An amendment that provides specific guidelines to ensure that
warnings reach vaccinees is essential because the warning itself serves
a critical function. The vaccine recipient, and the recipient's parents,
must be made aware of the potential side-effects so the parents can
monitor the vaccinee and act quickly if symptoms of an adverse reaction materialize. 1 3 1 Moreover, persons who come into close contact
with polio vaccinees should be made aware of the risk of contracting
polio from the vaccinee 132 and the precautions that reduce the risk.' 33
The threat of litigation by injured vaccinees against manufacturers,
at the cost of market stability, is not necessary to guarantee compliance with a warning requirement. The Act provides that a manufacturer must comply with all provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.' 34 Under this Act, the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") may impose specific drug warning requirements on pharma130. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
131.

1264 (5th

Cir. 1974); Davis v.

Dunn v. Lederle Laboratories, 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576, 579 (1982).

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).

Wyeth
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ceutical companies and the dispensers of pharmaceutical products. 135
Congress could require, under the terms of the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act, that the FDA promulgate warning requirements
for mass immunization clinics. In particular, the FDA could require
vaccine manufacturers to publish informational literature, such as
pamphlets and posters, that describe in lay terms the inherent risks in,
and the probabilities of injury from, a particular vaccine. Manufacturers would then be required to distribute the warnings to administrators of vaccines in mass immunization clinics. The administrators
could be required to provide the literature to each vaccine recipient
directly. The sanctions under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act for noncompliance with its regulations are sufficient to guarantee
that adequate warnings reach vaccinees136
IV.

CONCLUSION

In order to prevent a resurgence of crippling childhood diseases, all
children must continue to be innoculated. The unavoidable cost of an
an immunize population, however, is that each year a handful of individuals will suffer severe reactions, or die, from vaccinations. The
suits brought by these injured individuals against manufacturers jeopardize the nation's supply of childhood vaccines. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act responds to this vaccine liability crisis
created by the tort recovery system. It will provide swift and sure
compensation to injured vaccinees. In addition, the Act will create a
more stable production climate for vaccine manufacturers, thereby
providing an incentive for the continued production of childhood
vaccines.
The Act, however, does not fully resolve the vaccine liability crisis.
Congress should amend the Act to prohibit all tort actions on failure
to warn theories. Vaccine manufacturers should not be subjected to
the continued threat of vaccine injury suits because the unpredictable
nature of tort litigation may compel one or more of the few remaining
childhood vaccine producers to withdraw from production. The result
could be a vaccine shortage. At the same time that a compensation
scheme assures a conducive production climate for vaccine manufac135. A drug will be deemed misbranded unless the drug label bears an adequate warning. 21
U.S.C. § 352(f) (1982). A new drug must receive Food and Drug Administration approval
before it is introduced into interstate commerce. Id. § 355(a).
136. "Any person who violates a provision of [the Food Drug & Cosmetic Act] shall be
imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1000, or both." Id. § 322(a). In
addition, any drug that is misbranded when introduced into interstate commerce may be subject
to seizure. Id. § 334(a).
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turers, vaccine recipients must receive adequate warnings. In lieu of
the tort recovery system, the Act should be amended to require the
Food and Drug Administration to promulgate specific regulations for
manufacturers and administrators of vaccines.
The system that compensates the few who are inevitably injured by
vaccines cannot, in addition, threaten the vaccine supply that safeguards millions. In order to remedy this imbalance, the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act should be amended so as to provide the
exclusive means of recovery for individuals injured by compulsory
vaccination.
Mary Beth Neraas

